The beginnings of Hegel’s interest in “logic” as a branch of philosophy are somewhat obscure. In a lecture of 1830 Schelling claimed that Hegel first began to attend to the subject only because “his friends at the University” suggested that it was a good topic for his lectures because it was being neglected. Schelling’s object by then was evidently to suggest that Hegel’s “logic” had always been a superficial pretense. But Hegel was alive to contradict him. So I think his (...) statement of the facts must be right as far as it goes. I do not therefore believe that Hegel came to Jena with any “logical” manuscripts. In my view, it was Schelling himself—especially in his System of Transcendental Idealism —who sparked Hegel’s interest in the subject. (shrink)

At a time when some are questioning the relevancy of business education in general, others are now asking whether MBA programs should be blamed for society’s declining trust in business and the numerous corporate ethical failures of recent decades. Whether the full blame lies with business schools or not, MBA instructors are actively seeking more effective ways to help students adopt more practical and ethical managerial paradigms. Because trust theory is simple and robust and outlines the basic mental processes that (...) drive economic exchange while simultaneously prioritizing ethical behavior, in this article, we argue that it is distinctively suited to operationalize stakeholder theory in the classroom, providing MBA students with both a principled and a practical foundation or thematic platform for their MBA coursework and subsequent careers. We also discuss potential challenges and limitations and provide recommendations for future research. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is tied into an interesting and hitherto unexplored web of ideas in Plato’s ethics and psychology. The poet’s analysis of erōs as ‘leading us to what “belongs” (the oikeion)’ (193d2) and as ‘restoring us in our “original nature” (archaia phusis)’ (193d4) is not a mere negative contribution that renders him a ‘target for Diotima’s fire’ (Dover). Rather, he unwittingly communicates central ethical and psychological ideas which we find developed in (...) key passages of Plato’s dialogues. What is interesting is that Diotima in a curious passage seems to dismiss his contribution of the oikeion as unrelated to our good (agathon) and irrelevant to the analysis of desire (205d10–206a1). I argue that this interpretation of Diotima’s response to Aristophanes, which would render her position an ethical anomaly in Plato’s dialogues, should be rejected. Instead, it is more plausible to read her response as proposing a revisionary conception of the oikeion, relying on the idea that our agathon is our true oikeion. In addition, I tentatively suggest that the theory of psychic pregnancy may be seen as presenting the agathon of wisdom of virtue produced in the ascent as an oikeion. Just as fascinating as Diotima’s stance on the oikeion is the question how her teachings relate to the concept of an archaia phusis of the soul. The idea that the soul’s self-perfection constitutes a return to a temporally prior condition of excellence, which in two places other than the Symposium (Republic X, Timaeus) is called the ‘archaia phusis’, is pervasive and centrally important to Plato’s psychology. I address the question whether Diotima’s ascent passage constitutes a psychological anomaly in portraying self-perfection as unrelated to the concept of the archaia phusis. I argue that an answer to this depends on the stance we take on the Symposium’s position regarding the immortality of the soul. While a reading that posits a rejection of immortality in the Symposium must indeed deny a role for the concept in Diotima’s speech, I show that a reading allowing for immortality as a theoretical commitment in the background has an interesting interpretative option: along with Timaeus 90d5, it may fruitfully interpret the ascent as an ordering of the soul ‘in accordance with its archaia phusis’. (shrink)

H. S. Eveling; XI.—Composition and Criticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 213–232, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

This commentary is an attempt to sharpen some of the issues raised in the paper and thereby increase the generality of the proposal. Some implications of an exact definition of behavior for strategies of measurement and hence behavioral variability are discussed. The role of both respondent and operant behavior in natural selection is emphasized.

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 145-156, April 2024.

It is shown that the Born Rule probabilities, i.e. the squares of the moduli of the coefficients in a pure state superposition, refer to mutually exclusive events consequent on measurement. It is also shown that the eigenstates in a pure state superposition are not mutually exclusive events. If the Born Rule is to be retained as the fundamental interpretative postulate of quantum mechanics then it follows, firstly, that the probabilities necessarily refer not to the eigenstates but to the eigenvalues to (...) which the eigenstates belong and, secondly, that the eigenvalues are necessarily mutually exclusive events. This means that to ask why a measurement of an observable on a system in a pure state superposition of eigenstates yields a single state rather than all the states in the superposition is to ill-pose the quantum measurement problem. The events the Born Rule probabilities properly refer to are not states but values. And it also means that the correctly-posed measurement problem, why does a measurement of an observable in a pure state superposition of the eigenstates of the observable yield a single eigenvalue rather than all the eigenvalues implicit in the superposition, admits of the answer: the values, being mutually exclusive events, constitute a statistical mixture of values, and as such, a measurement will yield just one of them. (shrink)

Short stories from the lives of Prophet Muḥammad and Shiite Imams as a model of Islamic ethics.